

# REVIEWS

**Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights** by Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor, Praeger Publishers, 2003, 320 pp., \$34.95 (hardcover)

In *Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights*, Colonel Douglas Macgregor examines the Army's failure to transform. Instead of delaying transformation, he argues, the war leaves us little choice but to reform immediately. Macgregor maintains that recent Army attempts at transformation, relying on the Stryker and a distant Future Combat System, fail to address the heart of the Army's problem: its anachronistic and cumbersome organization at the tactical and operational levels. Macgregor, however, spends the majority of his book proposing a solution to the problem: an immediate reorganization of the Army's combat units and the fielding of currently available technology that will quickly address its tactical and operational needs.

Macgregor's ideas are not new. A Gulf war veteran who fought in the battle of 73 Easting, Colonel Macgregor went on to command 1-4 Cavalry at Fort Riley, Kansas. While serving there, he recognized the need to restructure the Army to meet the post-Cold War demands. He likened the new world order to the American frontier in the late 1800s, which no longer required the mass infantry formations of the Civil War, but a flexible, easily deployable expeditionary force of mounted formations. Macgregor's first book on transformation, *Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century*, lays out in detail his path to structural reform of the Army: forming self-contained 5,000-man units, composed of combat battalions and all of the support required to sustain them in combat (commanded by a brigadier general); elimination of Army divisions, and the formation of Joint Task Forces (commanded by a three-star general) which integrate all services strike (airpower, artillery, and aviation) and maneuver (Army and Marine Corps maneuver brigades) under a single, integrated command structure. Although his ideas received critical acclaim, they went nowhere with the conservative Army leadership.

In *Transformation Under Fire*, Macgregor argues that the "war transforms armies." Now, more than ever, the Army must finally shed its industrialized warfare skeleton, and adapt to the realities of information age warfare. The Army's essential structure has remained unchanged since the end of World War II, while the end of the Cold War necessitates that the Army transform into "an irresistible offensive-maneuver force against a fleeting, mobile enemy." While the Army has recently recognized the need for transformation, it has sought technological solutions at the expense of addressing the fundamental question of organization for joint warfare.

Rather than transforming to meet the Nation's needs, the Army is trying to "do what it wants to do." Macgregor explores the global trends that require a radically different approach to national security issues by the military.

Globalization has severely disrupted social structures in much of the developing world, and brought America plenty of new enemies in all corners of the earth. The complete dominance we enjoy in world power has forced our new enemies to resort to unconventional attacks to inflict harm on U.S. interests. This requires a radically different approach from our armed forces. The current administration has developed preemption as the national security strategy to deal with emerging threats — a strategy that requires early decision in a crisis. The Pentagon has switched to an "effects-based" strategy, which strives for early victory in conflicts by rapidly striking the enemy's strategic center of gravity. The Army's current attrition warfare structure does not position it to conduct rapid, decisive operations in support of the "effects-based" strategy.

Macgregor goes on to sketch out an operational reorganization into joint force headquarters, which integrate Army maneuver capabilities with strike capabilities of the Air Force and Navy. The Army would reorganize its core service capabilities into specialized modules that would support the joint task force mission. By cutting out the divisional structure and merging all branches of service at the joint task force level under a three-star general, the armed forces would have an organization capable of executing operations in a truly joint fashion with greatly reduced command decision cycles. Macgregor argues that the Army must create "network centric" organizations immediately. Combat groups (consisting of 5,000 soldiers) would be capable of independent, dispersed mobile warfare, rather than tightly scripted, coordinated mass maneuvers favored by divisions and corps. To forge truly effective combat groups, Macgregor urges training cycles based on unit manning concepts currently under consideration by Army leaders.

Macgregor reserves his last chapters for the upper echelons of the Army and what must change to effect true change. He calls for realignment of our combat power, shifting troops away from Cold War bases to forward bases that enable power projection and expeditionary warfare. He calls for returning units to the United States and rotating them through forward bases to provide forward capabilities to national leaders. Additionally, he argues for significant streamlining of the Army's command structures in Europe and Korea. Macgregor goes on to advocate a new, streamlined Army command structure to equip the new force, eliminating such headquarters as TRADOC and merging others. Bureaucracy and entrenched interests are the main impediments to effective, rapid transformation. Macgregor lambastes the Army's promotion system that rewards officers who are "yes-men," while punishing officers with bold, forward-thinking ideas. As an example, he points out that selection for general requires the unanimous consent of all 17 general officers on the board; essentially, a colonel who aspires to serve at the higher ranks must keep his nose clean and not upset anyone with his bold thinking. Finally, he takes the Army to task for remodeling existing

brigades, divisions, corps, and armies with new systems, while passively waiting for technology that is 10 years in the future; instead, they should be restructuring now, using existing technology to carry the Army through the battles of the next 15 years.

Macgregor's book is in the best tradition of military theorists, whose ideas transformed armies to meet the challenges of WWII: Hans von Seckt, B.H. Liddell Hart, Charles de Gaulle, and Heinz Guderian. Macgregor presents the first coherent view of how the information age should transform the way we organize for war. The question now remains whether the U.S. Army will heed his calls for true reform or continue to cede more and more of its missions to the Marine Corps, which has embraced expeditionary warfare. Macgregor takes to task the leadership culture that stifles change; but more importantly, he sketches out a realistic, immediate path to true transformation that will vault the Army out of exile at the Pentagon and back into the forefront of the Nation's fight in the war on terrorism.

CPT SAMUEL COOK

**Bush At War** by Bob Woodward, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2002, 376 pp., photos, index, \$28.00

This book details the Bush Administration's plan to conduct the war in Afghanistan. The pressures shortly after 11 September 2001 to find and bring to justice the people responsible for this tragedy were enormous. Bush did not want a hasty and ill-thought-out campaign.

President Bush stated he did not want a million-dollar missile going into a five-dollar tent. He wanted a well-thought-out plan, which would minimize loss of life to civilians and our own military. Concurrently, there was a humanitarian mission planned to coincide with military operations. Previously, there were no bases near Afghanistan available to the United States. The logistics and diplomacy needed to secure bases for our forces was extremely difficult. Afghanistan is in Russia's backyard, and naturally they were concerned with our presence. To make things more difficult, the press equated Afghanistan with Vietnam and often used the word "quagmire" to describe a war in that country.

Woodward authors the first book that goes into detail about the CIA's role in that war. The CIA is secretive, but their accomplishments should be noted. One of the CIA operatives earned the Intelligence Star posthumously, which is equivalent to the Silver Star. CIA operatives and Special Forces worked together for the first time. President Bush gave broad authority to the CIA and the military to bring the guilty to justice. I often wonder why so many of the Taliban and Afghan tribes switched sides in favor of the United States. The CIA gave out over 10-million dollars in cash for them to become our allies. In Afghanistan, the going price for a brigade was \$50,000. One Afghan

leader was balking at the amount. A Special Forces operative directed a precision-guided munition to explode near his command post. The Afghan leader called the next day and dropped his price to \$40,000. It is often joked that loyalty in Afghan changes with who is paying.

I learned a great deal about President Bush. The press release from *Bush at War* states it has over 15,000 words from direct quotes. Woodward had the administration's support in writing his book. I liked the quotes from President Bush that reflect his feelings about 11 September and the war in Afghanistan. They bring to life the presidency of the United States.

The only change to this book I would make is that I would call it *Bush at War*, Part I. I am positive that Woodward can accurately write the story of our nation's recent war with Iraq. *Bush at War* makes interesting reading. Take the time to read *Bush at War*. I am sure you will learn more about how the United States will conduct future warfare and diplomacy.

ERIC SHULER  
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**Wilson's Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century** by James G. Blight and Robert S. McNamara, Public Affairs, New York, 2003, 304 pp., \$14.00 (paperback)

*When a man hath no freedom to fight for at home, Let him combat for that of his neighbors; Let him think of the glories of Greece and of Rome, and get knock'd on the head for his labours. To do good to mankind is the chivalrous plan, and is always as nobly requited; Then battle for freedom wherever you can, and, if not shot or hang'd, you'll get knighted.*

— Lord Byron

In their new book *Wilson's Ghost*, Robert S. McNamara and James G. Blight propose that the 21st century can avoid repeating the carnage and conflict that was the cornerstone of the 20th century.

*Wilson's Ghost* was inspired by former President Woodrow Wilson's idealism and vision of collective security in the post-World War I *Peace without Victory* world. The authors propose an agenda based on nuclear disarmament, multilateral security cooperation, and integration of non-Western great powers into a new world order. In the view of the authors, returning to the Cold War diplomacy of realpolitik is shortsighted and not compatible with the new interconnected world global economy. Nations like China, India, and Russia must be as fully integrated in the family of nations, as were Germany and Japan following World War II. In dealing with the epidemics of failed states and genocide, the United States should demonstrate *realistic empathy*, abandon unilateral preemptive intervention, rely more on the leaders of alliance partners like France and Germany, and contribute to a United Na-

tions capable of deploying its own 9-11 force. Blight and McNamara argue that the United States should avoid building an antimissile defense system and phase out all nuclear weapons. In a recent interview following the publication of *Wilson's Ghost*, McNamara stated that a central argument in his book is that the United States must avoid seeming arrogant. He warned against high-minded, high-handed, overwhelming American pride and American arrogance. Interestingly, the same proposals espoused by Blight and McNamara are also found in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) signed by President George W. Bush. Many of Wilson's ideas are found in the NSS: A world safe for democracy, institutions with teeth, and the elimination of tyranny.

Problems with Bright and McNamara's thesis include the assumption that nondemocratic states are willing to accept the economic and social ideals that come with democracy. Since the end of the Cold War, many states who have embraced democracy have done so because Western nations (the United States in particular) were willing to use their great power status both economically and militarily. The Soviet Union, for example, became a democracy only because President Ronald Reagan was willing to stand up against the Soviet empire. Second, had Wilson been alive on 11 September 2001, he would have probably agreed with President Bush's unilateral preemptive intervention policy. Both Bright and McNamara ignore the fact that Wilson in 1916 ordered U.S. troops into Mexico following a terrorist attack led by Pancho Villa. Finally, *Wilson's Ghost* is replete with McNamara's constant mea culpa for his role in the Vietnam War. As political commentator Anne Coulter wrote recently, "McNamara's [own] dispute-resolution technique, which consists of starting a ground war in a jungle, losing the war, condemning millions of people to live under communist tyranny, and then casually announcing 25 years later that you knew the war was doomed from the start."

Robert S. McNamara was president of the Ford Motor Company, Secretary of Defense to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and President of the World Bank. He is the author of *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam* and co-author of *Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy*. He is a board member of the Pugwash Foundation. James G. Blight is professor of international relations at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University and is a renowned author and editor of numerous books on the recent history of U.S. foreign policy, including *Argument Without End*.

I recommend *Wilson's Ghost* as a primer for students who wish to learn more about the liberal view of foreign policy. Its chapters are a timely read, given current U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and provide strategic planners with some insight on current U.S. national security strategy.

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**The Road to Rivoli: Napoleon's First Campaign** by Martin Boycott-Brown, Sterling Publishing Company, Inc., New York, 2002, 640 pp., \$21.95

In the introduction to *The Road to Rivoli*, Martin Boycott-Brown states that the book "aims to tell the story of the campaign, concentrating on the military aspect. While doing this, it attempts to say something about the experiences of the local civilian population." While accomplishing the first goal, he fails in the second as the experiences of the civilians tend to fade in the later chapters. *The Road to Rivoli* is an exhaustive account of Napoleon's first Italian campaign, focusing on the actions of the Austrian and French armies as they battled across Northern Italy in 1796-1797. The author draws on a wealth of secondary sources, complemented by numerous primary sources in English, French, Italian, and Austrian, giving his work a refreshingly balanced perspective.

Boycott-Brown wastes a great deal of time laying the foundation for the campaign. He uses over 120 pages to explain the basics of Napoleonic warfare, the origins of the conflict, and the nature of the French and Austrian armies. Much of this is not needed, as this is not a book for a novice of the Napoleonic era. Boycott-Brown sticks to his initial aim of telling the military history of the campaign and, unfortunately, provides very little in the way of analysis. Reading the book is not easy, by any means, and appropriate analysis at various points would have made the book more interesting and easier to digest.

However, the greatest fault of the work is the lack of suitable maps and orders of battle. At times, the author details the action down to the regimental and battalion levels, and unless one knows which brigade, division, or corps a specific commander belongs to, one gets lost. The book has 10 pages of maps in the center of the book; however these maps fail to detail any troop movements or positions, making it very difficult to follow the action. To fully understand the situation, the reader is required to have a map of northern Italy in front of him, as well as another book detailing the orders of battle for the campaign.

*The Road to Rivoli* is not a book for the Napoleonic novice, and even the more experienced reader will have difficulty with this book. On the other hand, if one is looking for a decent account of Napoleon's first campaign, then it is worth the read.

LTC JOHN M. KEEFE  
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**Rommel and His Art of War**, ed. John Pimlott, Greenhill Books, London, 2003, 224 pp., \$19.95 (paperback)

This is an odd little book, constructed from scraps of primary source material sandwiched between fairly insightful comments from the editor. It covers the highlights of Rommel's combat career from the First World War through his forced suicide in the fall of 1944. When I

say the highlights, I mean that 90 percent of the material covers a half-dozen battles, most of them in the Western Desert 1941-1942. There is precious little about the rest of Rommel's career or about Rommel the man; the closest we come is some not particularly revealing letters to his wife. The material is gleaned from official reports, war diaries, correspondence, and after-action reports, most but not all authored by Rommel.

The value of this book depends on the reader. One completely unfamiliar with the subject would come away with a minimalist understanding of Rommel's technique, but very little idea of the demons that drove this most interesting character. Those with greater knowledge might draw some useful nuggets from the numerous anecdotes and vignettes contained between the covers, some of which are not (as far as I know) printed in English elsewhere. Pimlott's commentary is also valuable; he is no hagiographer, and his judgments concerning Rommel are concise and reasonable.

Overall, however, there is very little new here, and nothing that would cause a reader with even a modest grasp of the subject matter to reassess his opinions. Most of the selections are pedestrian, and one suspects that some have not seen the light of day before for good reason. Most annoying, the selections are not annotated and there are no maps for Rommel's World War II campaigns. For this latter fault, the editor should be boiled in his own correction fluid, as trying to follow the swirling desert battles without a map is simply impossible.

It is tragic that two of the premier generals of armored warfare, Patton and Rommel, did not survive to write their memoirs of the last world war. Rommel's, in particular, would have been most interesting, given his early support of Hitler, his gradual disillusionment, and his literary style. Lacking a memoir, however, there are numerous works available that would give anyone interested a better understanding of Rommel as man and warrior (B.H. Liddell Hart's or David Fraser's for starters) than Pimlott's collection. I would recommend passing this book up and finding something meatier.

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**Blood Red Snow: The Memoirs of a German Soldier on the Eastern Front** by Gunter K. Koschorrek, Greenhill Books, London, 2002, 318 pp., \$34.95 (hardcover)

From the fall of 1942 until May 1945, Gunter Koschorrek, a German soldier, fought on the front lines during the Second World War as a heavy machine gunner and heavy weapons section chief, for the most part in the East against Russia. As he fought, he maintained accounts of his experiences and thoughts during his service, to include periods of convalescence from six wounds. In the turbulent years immediately following the war, Koschorrek's notes were lost, and were only rediscovered in the mid-1990s by a descendant. Upon re-

union with his notes, the former German soldier decided to compile an account, describing his personal experiences in the Second World War. The result, *Blood Red Snow*, is one of the latest in the line of personal histories depicting life during the Second World War.

Koschorrek began his wartime service during the winter of 1942-43 fighting in the vicinity of Stalingrad. Although only rarely fighting in the city, he was in the middle of the massive Soviet counterattack of November 1942 that led to Sixth Army's destruction, and his first few months of combat were spent conducting a desperate fighting retreat in the middle of winter. After his first injury, he served in Italy, battling partisans before returning to Russia, and remained on that front as it steadily receded eastward through Romania and Poland.

Koschorrek's work very clearly is written from the perspective of one who is revisiting memories after a period of many decades, and although this presents certain challenges, it is not necessarily a bad thing. While some of the passages depicting combat are compelling and vivid, many other sections of the book are reflective. A number of events bring to mind other, more recent, depictions of 20th-century combat, both fictitious and factual. His experiences during home leave echo those of Paul in Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front*; many of his remembrances of winter combat evoke images from the German movie, "Stalingrad," and his commentaries on military leadership align closely with those in Sajer's *Forgotten Soldier*. Occasionally, such reflection borders on moral preaching, as when the author discusses hunting partisans and the "killing of the defenseless." For the most part, however, the author's insertion of a modern context on his thoughts and memories is insightful and complementary to the progression of the book.

The strongest passages in the work are those that deal with fighting on the Eastern Front, particularly in the beginning and toward the end of the war. Koschorrek's account of the war's final days is particularly intriguing, as he recovers from his final wound, waiting to discover whether his fate will leave him in the American or Soviet zone of occupation. While the author exhibits a high degree of professional respect for his Russian foes, he voices an equally negative view of the American soldiers he sees, although this latter number is admittedly quite small. In his 3 years of service, Koschorrek never fought against American forces, and only came in contact with them in the last days of the war.

This is an enjoyable book for those readers who are fascinated by personal accounts from history. While not as compelling as Sajer or some of the more well-known personal accounts from the wars of this century, it certainly ranks above average. Once started, it is a difficult book to put down and will find a wide audience among military historians and buffs alike.

MAJ MICHAEL BODEN  
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**Deception in War: The Art of the Bluff, the Value of Deceit, and the Most Thrilling Episodes of Cunning in Military History, from the Trojan Horse to the Gulf War** by Jon Latimer, The Overlook Press, New York, by arrangement with John Murray Publishers, 2001, 356 pp. with illustrations, \$35.00

Pity the soul who finds himself in functional area 30 — the information operations (IO) officer — for he is still a stranger in a strange land. Too often during exercises he finds himself treated much like his predecessors who dealt with electronic warfare: shoved off to the side of the exercise area, and only called on when someone recalls that he is "value added" and essential to being graded as passing the exercise.

Too many seniors still pay lip service to IO in the U.S. Army, lacking a full understanding of the "six pillars and two enablers," which compose the concept in full. The enablers are public affairs and civil affairs, and the pillars are physical destruction, electronic warfare, operations security, computer network operations, psychological operations, and deception. All have to be balanced to provide the desired outcome of information dominance on the battlefield and the goal of increased effects with reduced losses.

This easy-to-read and highly entertaining book is by a former engineer officer in the British army, and brings one of the older pillars of IO into sharp focus. Deception is one of the oldest stratagems used as what we now call a "combat multiplier" and is still one of the most effective, if done correctly.

This book is not so much a linear history of deception as it is a description of deception and how it is applied, with many examples of right and wrong applications. Mr. Latimer considers information warfare to be a subset of deception, which runs counter to U.S. thinking, but he does explain his reasoning, and in some measure, presents a plausible case. Definitions aside, he is emphatic that persuading your opponent to willingly make choices favorable to you is the ultimate goal, and goes on to cover many incidents in history (he does gloss over the Trojan Horse, albeit it was one of the first deception operations that survives, myth or not, to this day).

Mr. Latimer covers the various types of deceptions — visual, aural, sensual, and electronic; and the echelons — tactical, operational, strategic, and local wars and regional conflicts as well as actions against terrorists and nonstate organizations. He has apparently been intimate with the British Public Records Office and has a tremendous amount of information on British and U.S. activities during World War II, to include how many deception plans were run to support D-Day — a total of 36 — and the other activities in the Mediterranean and North Africa.

Part of the book focuses on the changes from the oldest forms of intelligence collection — spies, prisoners, and scouts — and how they



were duped into believing the desired position of their opponents, and how modern intelligence collection via technical means (signal intelligence and imagery intelligence) are both more able to detect deception and more vulnerable to it. Even with multispectral sensors, simple decoys remain effective, and he cites the recent experiences of coalition forces in Iraq (1991) and Yugoslavia (1999) as cases in point.

He also spends some time in the area of "local wars and regional conflicts" and describes some of the problems we are now beginning to face in dealing with nonstate actors such as al-Qaeda. He cites the British experiences in Malaya, Kenya, and Northern Ireland, as well as past U.S. successes, such as dealing with the Huk rebellion in the Philippines in the 1940s and 1950s. He lays out a number of good points needed to deal with nonstate actors.

Mr. Latimer does not seem to be anti-American in his comments about the U.S. forces and the good and bad work they have done in the area of deception operations, but he does point out two particularly egregious examples. The first one is Tet 68, in which American political desires and mistaken beliefs by MACV in Saigon let them accept the massive deception plan created by Vo Nguyen Giap that the Vietnamese were not winning, and were planning to come to the peace table early in 1968, and that the U.S. was dominating the war.

The reality of course, as we know now, was a multipurpose stratagem to accomplish multiple goals. It would demonstrate that the communists were still committed to winning the war, inflict a heavy blow on the Americans and demoralize them, crush the ability of Saigon to prosecute the war and lower their standing in the eyes of the people, and use undesirable "southerners" to carry out the attacks, thus minimizing PAVN losses. MACV agreed with all of the information it saw, as did Washington, and even in the face of local U.S. intelligence reporting to the exact opposite (massive supply buildups, orders for specific attacks, and reorganizations and tasking of VC units), MACV bought the deception plan in toto.

The actual attacks wound up being a total disaster physically for the VC and did not accomplish a single VPAF goal. In retrospect, the Tet offensive turned out to be one of the greatest victories for U.S. arms in the 20th century. But the images of U.S. forces running and piling behind walls in confusion, and the boasts by Washington and MACV that the war was nearly won, combined with the media's increasingly biased and antiwar views of operations in Vietnam, turned this into a strategic defeat for the United States, the like of which it had never known in its history. Mr. Latimer attributes this to the "law of unintended consequences." For example, if you succeed in your goals, things may still not turn out the way you planned, it should have been a massive wakeup call to the U.S. military to not take too much for granted in the light of intelligence reporting to the contrary.

The other major U.S. failing in the eyes of Mr. Latimer is creating and manifesting "intelli-

gence preparation of the battlefield" (IPB), a concept which is absolutely vulnerable to a sharp enemy using deception to delude U.S. commanders into making big mistakes in combat.

IPB basically consists of doing force assessments, such as type, nature, size, tactics, historical activities, and terrain assessments, such as avenues of approach, areas of interest, target areas of interest or kill zones, and plugging them into templates and matching them to enemy activities. Once the basic work is done, it is a matter of waiting for intelligence items to "light up" and plug them into the plan to see where the enemy is in his template. This worked well in testing against computer models in the early 1980s, where the enemy was literally robotic and only did what the computer programming told it to do. However, the "real" enemy (to include the National Training Center) did not do that, even if they did follow doctrinal events.

Mr. Latimer is correct in the fact that there is a high degree of slavishness in the U.S. Army to IPB in many areas. He is also dead on the money when he points out how vulnerable we are to trusting our technical intelligence means to "connect the dots" in IPB and the possibility of complete disaster if we place too much trust in both of them. Having seen both things happen, I concur, and recommend this book to reawaken thinking in how we view the world through military glasses.

STEPHEN L. "COOKIE" SEWELL  
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**The Diaries of John Gregory Bourke, Volume 1, November 20, 1872-July 28, 1876**, edited and annotated by Charles M. Robinson III, University of North Texas Press, Denton, TX, 2003, 518 pp., \$49.95

Those who have read his memoir, *On the Border With Crook*, will recognize the name of John Gregory Bourke. Written over a century ago, it is one of the classics of the Indian Wars. An officer of the 3rd Cavalry, Bourke was Brigadier General George Crook's aide-de-camp for 14 years, serving in every major campaign in Arizona and the Northern Plains. A prolific writer, he kept a monumental set of diaries that began when he was a young cavalry lieutenant in Arizona in 1872 and only ended the evening before his death in 1896. Except for published extracts, these 124 manuscript diaries have only been available at the West Point Library and on microfilm. Charles M. Robinson, III has the massive task of editing and annotating the diaries. This is volume 1 of a planned set of 6 volumes.

John Bourke was more than just another cavalry officer in the West who happened to write his memoir. He became interested in the lives of Indians, becoming a respected ethnologist, a devoted scholar of Indian beliefs, customs, and traditions. He was an interested observer of his environment, including in his diaries a number of maps and sketches.

Bourke was born in Philadelphia in 1846 of well-to-do parents, receiving an excellent parochial school education. Caught up in Civil

War patriotic euphoria, he lied about his age and enlisted at 16 in the 15th Pennsylvania Volunteer Cavalry. He earned the Medal of Honor at Stone's River (Murfreesboro), fought at Chancellorsville and Chattanooga, and served with Sherman's army in Georgia. Mustered out in July 1865, he entered West Point and graduated number 11 of 39 in the class of 1869. After extensive field duty in New Mexico and Arizona with the 3d Cavalry, in September 1871, he was appointed aide-de-camp to General Crook, new commander, Department of Arizona. It was in this role that he began his diaries.

The first part of this volume covers the period when Crook was commanding the Department of Arizona. This was the land of the Apaches and trouble with them dated from before the Civil War. Soon after Crook assumed command, he launched a general offensive against the Apaches. Although the period lasted from November 1872 until April 1875, when Crook was reassigned, there are 18 months of missing diary (April 1873-September 1874). Nevertheless, in this volume, Bourke provides an excellent account of the campaigning and frontier life.

Crook's next assignment was commander of the Department of the Platte, an area that covered Nebraska, Iowa, Wyoming, Utah, and southern Idaho. Bourke described the trip from Arizona to Omaha, department headquarters, providing an excellent description of Southern California in its early development days, and Utah as it transitioned from the Mormon theocracy. In his new command, Crook faced a powder keg ready to explode. Indian problems went back 9 years when the Indians fought the government to a standstill. Although the resulting treaty with the Sioux tribes ceded much of what is now North and South Dakota, white incursions into the area, especially resulting from the discovery of gold, meant the treaty would not last.

Bourke's diaries cover Colonel R. I. Dodge's Black Hills expedition of 1875. He then leads into the Great Sioux War of 1876-1877, the brutal conflict most famous for the destruction of Custer and five troops of the 7th Cavalry. Crook's column was one of three converging on the Indian encampment and experienced battle with the Indians in the battle of the Rosebud, more than a week before the disaster to Custer's command.

Bourke was an observant and articulate writer. His diaries are detailed and provide one of the best existing word pictures of what life was really like in the West during the Indian Wars. His writing also provides an excellent study of his own changing attitude toward the Indians as he realizes that fault and evil are not all on one side.

Robinson has done an excellent job of editing Bourke's work, as well as providing sufficient background material to allow the reader to place the diaries in proper context. This is the first of the volumes; the overall effort promises to provide a significant addition to the literature of the Indian Wars period.

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